



Reliability and Fault-Tolerance Strategy in the MYRRHA Superconducting Linac

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MYRRHA Project

Multi-purpose hYbrid Research Reactor for High-tech Applications At Mol (Belgium)

Development, construction & commissioning of a new large fast neutron research infrastructure

Accelerator Driven System demonstrator

Past neutron irradiation facility

Output for LFR technology







Demonstrate the physics and technology of an Accelerator Driven System (ADS) for transmuting long-lived radioactive waste

Demonstrate the ADS concept

(coupling accelerator + spallation source + power reactor)

Demonstrate the transmutation (experimental assemblies)







Extreme reliability level



Reliability Requirements

Greneb Laboratoire de Physique Subatomique et de Cosse

- Beam trips longer than 3 sec must be very rare:
- To minimise thermal stress & fatigue on the target window, reactor structures & fuel assemblies
- To ensure an 80% availability given the foreseen reactor start-up procedures







- In any case, reliability guidelines are needed for the ADS accelerator design:
- **Content** Robust design i.e. robust optics, simplicity, low thermal stress, operation margins...
- **Redundancy** (serial where possible, or parallel) to be able to tolerate/mitigate failures
- **Repairability** (on-line where possible) and efficient maintenance schemes



• Layout of the MYRRRHA linac



• Initial configuration Operational injector 1: RF + PS + beam ON Re-buncher-1 Re-huncher 1.5 Me 3.5 MeV 3.5 MeV The switching magnet **TTT** polarity is changed (~1s) 3.5 Mo\ Warm stand-by injector 2: RF+ PS ON, beam OFF (on FC) Need for an efficient fault diagnostic system !

2 A failure is detected anywhere

Beam is resumed



3 The failure is localized in injector

Fault compensation in the main linac: Serial Redundancy







Figure 12 : Transverse beam distribution at 220 µs, in red are plotted the losses

- A failure is detected anywhere
- \rightarrow Beam is stopped by the MPS in injector at t₀
- The fault is localised in a SC cavity RF loop

 \rightarrow Need for an efficient fault diagnostic system

 New V/φ set-points are updated in cavities (cryomodule) adjacent to the failed one

→ Set-points determined in advance: via virtual accelerator application and/or during the commissioning phase



The failed cavity is detuned (to avoid the beam loading effect)





• Once steady state is reached, beam is resumed at $t_1 < t_0 + 3sec$

 \rightarrow Failed RF cavity system to be repaired on-line if possible





- End 90's: several collaborative R&D activities worldwide on ADS accelerators : (APT/AAA, TRASCO, etc. w/ especially a CEA/CNRS/INFN collaboration)
- 2001: "The European roadmap for developing ADS for Nuclear Waste Incineration", European Technical Working Group on ADS (*chaired by C. Rubbia, ENEA*)
- **2002-2004:** MYRRHA is studied as one of the 3 reactor designs within the **PDS-XADS FP5 project** (coord. Framatome/AREVA): cyclotron turns into linac, first reliability analyses show a need for fault-tolerance capability
- 2005-2010: MYRRHA is studied as the <u>XT-ADS demo</u> within the <u>EUROTRANS FP6 project</u> (coord. FZK): 600 MeV linac conceptual design, R&D activities w/ focus on reliability
- 2010: MYRRHA is on the ESFRI list, and officially supported by the Belgium government at a 40% level (384M€, w/ 60M€ already engaged)
- 2010-2014: MYRRHA accelerator advanced design phase supported by the EURATOM FP7 project : MAX (MYRRHA Accelerator eXperiment R&D)
- 2015-2019: MYRRHA accelerator design and prototyping supported by Horizon 2020 -Research and Innovation Framework Programme: MYRTE (MYRRHA Research and Transmutation Endeavour) - WP2. Project just started.





• Dedicated R&D for the MYRRHA injector







- First meters of the MYRRHA linac (initiate the construction)
- Compact design, with 2 solenoids & 1 electrostatic chopper.
- An accelerator mock up for:
 - Beam dynamics studies: i.e. space charge compensation
 - Reliability studies, with long run tests
 - To initiate the EPICS control system implementation & strategy





RFQ (30 keV to 1.5 MeV)



- 4-Rod RFQ at 176.1 MHz (4 meters long)
- Less expensive than a 4-Vane with more simple mechanical parts
- Easier to tune than a 4-Vane
- Possibility to repair
- Need Particular attention for the cooling channel layout

Parameter	Value	unit
Frequency	176.1	MHz
Energy	1.5	MeV
Voltage	44	kV
Current	5	mA
R _p	67 (77)	$k\Omega m$
RF power	108	kW
P/L	25	kW/m

• A 0.4 meter prototype have been built and tested at IAP Frankfurt to validate the cooling channel layout











- As much as possible
- Temperature distribution as homogeneous as possible



Courtesy of H. Podlech



RFQ prototype : RF power tests and first long run





Courtesy of H. Podlech



Parameter	Value	unit
Frequency	175.5	MHz
L	400	mm
а	3.7	mm
ρ	3	mm
R _p (expected)	67	kΩm
R _p (measured)	77	k Ω m
Q ₀ (expected)	3750	
Q ₀ (measured)	4300	
RF power (goal)	30	kW
P/L	75	kW/m





- No amplitude control.
- Linear power density was 3 times higher than required for MYRRHA.
- Down Times:
- One major due to amplifier shut down (40 min): internal error.
- some short (>1 s) downtimes due to sparking
- ⇒ a few longer (1-20 s) due to high reflection. This can be avoided by using sufficient large sinculators.







- Enable E_{acc} increase by 30 % for fault-compensation.
- "Smooth" phase advance variation : avoid SC-driven resonances, instabilities & emittance exchange.
- Large acceptance: enable the retuning scheme & avoid beam losses.

Section #	#1	#2	#3
E _{input} (MeV)	17.0	80.8	183.9
E _{output} (MeV)	80.8	184.2	600.0
Cav. technology	Spoke	Elliptical	
Cav. freq. (MHz)	352.2	704.4	
Cavity geom. β	0.35	0.47	0.65
Cavity optim. β	0.375	0.510	0.705
Nb of cells / cav.	2	5	5
Focusing type	NC quadrupo	NC quadrupole doublets	
Nb cav / cryom.	2	2	4
Total nb of cav.	48	34	60
Nominal E _{acc} (MV/m) *	6.4	8.2	11.0
Synch. phase (deg)	-40 to -18	-36 to -15	
Beam load / cav (kW)	1.5 to 8	2 to 17	14 to 32
Nom. Qpole grad. (T/m)	5.1 to 7.7	4.8 to 7.0	5.1 to 6.6
Section length (m)	73.0	63.9	100.8

*Eacc is given at $\beta_{\textit{opt}}$ normalised to L_{acc} = Ngap. $\beta.\lambda/2$

J-L. Biarrotte et al. Proc. SRF2013



R&D for retuning procedures in less than 3 seconds



- Feasibility of the retuning procedures in less than 3 seconds
- Matlab Simulink Model : Cavity + feedback loops
- feasible in less than 1 second

But requires a fast frequency tuning system able to detune the cavity at a speed of 5 kHz/sec by at least 100*bandwidth (~ 10 kHz)



Dedicated R&D on superconducting cavity (Spoke & 5-cell elliptical)



Beam studies for fault-recovery





- Section #1: 1 Spoke cavity
- Section #2: 1 Cryomodule (i.e. 2 cavities)
- Section #1: 1 elliptical cavity



- ⇒ A few critical scenario tested and identified (11).
- Most critical with 25 % of the cavity failed not tested
- Retuning simulations carried out with a "perfect linac" (No errors-homogenous E_{acc} distribution)

F. Bouly et al., Proc. Linac 2014







• Same example multiple failures example with errors (static and dynamic).

- 1000 linacs simulated with 10⁶ macro-particles
- In the last section the losses are close by the acceptable limit of 1 W/m

Emittance growth in section #2 with the failed cryomodule.

- Longitudinal acceptance is the key point for beam loss control
- (MeV) Investigate to improve the method and find a less aggressive retuning scheme (use more cavities?)



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Reliability Model of the full accelerator

- 1st step: Development of a fault tree reliability model of the SNS
- SNS Design (Systems and Functions) SNS public info; SNS Design Control Documents (DCDs)

Reliability Data (Quantifying model) - Failure - MTTF and repair times – MTTR : SNS Operation team (SNS BlockSim model – G. Dodson, J. Galambos)

- SNS Operating Data: logbook (Benchmarking)
- Good agreement between the model and operating data

73% availability of the SNS Linac resulting from model is confirmed by the availability figures of the SNS from the first years of SNS operation.

SNS Goals	<u>G.Doason , ARW 2011</u>			
Year	Neutron Production Availability		Integrated (M	l Beam Power W-hrs)
	Commitment	Actual	Commitment	Actual
FY2007	68.0%	65.7%	117	159
FY2008	74.0%	72.0%	877	945
FY2009	80.0%	80.7%	2031	2166
FY2010	85.0%	85.6%	N/A	
FY2011	88.0%	91%YTD	N/A	
FY2012	90.0%	TBD	N/A	

- The reliability results show that the most affected SNS Linac parts/systems are:
 - Superconducting linac (SCL), Injector, Diagnostics & Controls
 - RF systems (especially the SCL RF system)
 - Power Supplies and PS Controllers

These results are consistent with the records in the SNS Logbook







MYRRHA linac modelling



A. Pitigoi, Workshop MAX-EUCARD2, 2014

- Overall approach
- Fault Tree, based on SNS model + Max design
- Basic Events: Component / Function failures
- Undeveloped Events/Systems: Reliability targets
- Reliability model: Availability / Failure frequency (Linac shutdown)
- Reliability Analysis: Design Optimization



• Modeling Assumptions

Solid state ⇒ SNS (except Klystrons, modulators) ← Solid state amplifier s (SSAs)

- Missing Reliability data
 - → Assumptions (Equipment overall Reliability data from manufacture
- Control system modelling
- Fault tree development (Myrrha control philosophy)
- Defined diagnostics included in the fault tree
- S Missing datas: Diagnostics, acquisition, signal transmission...







- The Fault compensation scheme is effective, **but only if the linac has an intrinsic optimized** reliability
- First results gives ~550 trips/years with a "standard" (No-redundancy) linac (~70% availability)
- ⇒ Fault compensation strategy enable to decrease the number of trips by ~100/year (parallel + serial redundancy)
- The MYRRHA goal : 40 trips/year (10 per 3-months period)
- \bigcirc Goal : ~140 trips/year for the standard linac → Reduce the number of compensation events
- Need for intelligent fail-over redundancy implementation in controllers
- A strong effort is needed for Diagnostics & controls systems developments: must be designed with a high level of reliability.
- Implement redundancy of systems, subsystems and components most affected by failures





- Within the MYRTE project (WP2) R&D will be strongly focused on the injector:
 - LEBT & RFQ construction and operation SSAs & control systems R&D
 - ➡ A "Platform" for low energy proton beam dynamics
 - Dedicated to reliability studies (collecting failure datas, long run tests ...)
- Improvements of the Fault compensation procedure:
 - Improve the methodology to calculate the cavity set points
 - Consider a "non-perfect" linac
 - Possibility to use more cavities to compensate one failure
- Improve the reliability tree model of the MYRRHA linac to anticipate, as best as possible, on the critical points for the linac detailed design

THANK YOU